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When is foreign exchange intervention effective?
Evidence from 33 countries
Marcel Fratzscher, Oliver Gloede, Lukas Menkhoff, Lucio Sarno and Tobias Stöhr
Abstract
This paper examines foreign exchange intervention based on novel daily data covering 33
countries from 1995 to 2011. We find that intervention is widely used and an effective policy
tool, with a success rate in excess of 80 percent under some criteria. The policy works well in
terms of smoothing the path of exchange rates, and in stabilizing the exchange rate in countries
with narrow band regimes. Moving the level of the exchange rate in flexible regimes requires
that some conditions are met, including the use of large volumes and that intervention is made
public and supported via communication.
JEL-Classification: F31, F33, E58.
Keywords: Foreign exchange intervention; exchange rate regimes; effectiveness measures;
communication.
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Foreign exchange (FX) reserves of central banks have accumulated to the high-
est level ever seen in recent history, in absolute terms and in relation to GDP.
This accumulation of FX reserves raises concerns about global imbalances in
the world economy (e.g. Jeanne and Rancière, 2011) and about the potential
for "currency wars" (see Eichengreen, 2013). At the same time, central bankers
generally believe in FX intervention as a useful policy tool (Neely, 2008). The
last global financial crisis has shifted the focus even more towards smoothing
exchange rate fluctuations to limit FX volatility (Mohanty and Berger, 2013;
Blanchard et al., 2015), and recent theory claims that interventions may be wel-
fare enhancing (Gabaix and Maggiori, 2015; Hassan et al., 2016; Cavallino,
2017).1
We take these facts and policy concerns as motivation to examine the effec-
tiveness of FX intervention in a systematic manner. We try to overcome the
reliance of the extant empirical literature on small samples consisting of only a
single country or a few countries. Due to this data limitation, lessons learned
necessarily refer to specific circumstances which are difficult to compare across
countries and thus tend to have low external validity. By contrast we examine a
broad cross-section of countries in order to draw general lessons and detect the
determinants of (more) effective FX interventions. Accordingly, we compile a
new dataset on daily FX interventions by 33 central banks which comprise both
actual interventions and communication about FX interventions.
This dataset is crucial for our study, because the bottleneck of research on FX
intervention has long been data availability. Many studies have to rely on press
reports about central bank intervention (Fischer, 2006) or use intervention data
of single countries directly provided to the researcher (e.g., Fischer and Zurlin-
den, 1999). Only a few central banks publish their intervention data and there-
fore have been intensively studied by academics. However, this pool of avail-
able data is small and composed mainly of advanced economies. Thus studies
either cover just few countries (such as three countries in the influential study
by Dominguez and Frankel, 1993) or have to rely on lower quality data, such
as weekly aggregates, or on proxies of actual intervention amounts, such as
the change in foreign reserves (e.g., Adler and Tovar, 2011; Levy-Yeyati et al.,
2013; Daude et al., 2014; Adler et al., 2015).
Our data come from 33 central banks, of which 23 central banks do not make
their data publicly available. Reliable daily intervention data, covering only
sterilized interventions, stretch over a maximum period from 1995 to 2011.
1See also the surveys on FX intervention by Edison (1993), Sarno and Taylor (2001), Neely (2005), and the
recent studies of Adler and Tovar (2011), Levy-Yeyati et al. (2013), Daude et al. (2014), Adler et al. (2015).
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This dataset has some overlap with a few other studies on single countries or
small groups of countries; otherwise it opens a new universe that allows us to
establish stylized facts, examine key differences across countries and exchange
rate regimes, and distinguish the relative importance of FX intervention deter-
minants across countries.
The first step of the analysis is the description of intervention behavior through
the lens of our new data. Due to the broad coverage of the sample we can provide
a more representative picture about intervention characteristics than is common
in the literature. The dataset consists of almost 114,000 trading days. On these
days the sampled central banks intervened, on average, on 19.1 percent of days.
This may be surprisingly frequent with the recent experience of the major ad-
vanced economies in mind, in particular when considering that the U.S. Federal
Reserve and the European Central Bank hardly intervene in FX anymore. How-
ever, many central banks, in particular in emerging and developing economies,
intervene frequently.
Our main finding is that exchange rate intervention is an effective policy tool
according to different criteria used to judge the success of FX interventions. We
use several different success criteria, building on the work by Fatum and Hutchi-
son (2003) and Fratzscher (2008). These criteria look at the directional change
of the exchange rate on the day of an intervention as well as the volatility and sta-
bilization during subsequent days. Generally, we find fairly high success rates
of FX interventions, contradicting those studies nurturing skepticism against
the usefulness of interventions (e.g., Schwartz, 2000). Moreover, this finding is
methodologically far from self-evident in a large cross-section of heterogeneous
countries, given their different intervention objectives. Specifically, it is key to
apply different success criteria that distinguish between currency regimes with
more exchange rate flexibility and those with limited flexibility (i.e. a narrow
band of exchange rate variation) to reflect the difference in policy objectives of
the intervening authorities.
It is only for the more flexible regimes, dominating in advanced economies, that
the conventional effectiveness measures (e.g. moving the level of the exchange
rate) are fully appropriate. Regarding countries with narrow bands, however, it
seems more suitable to measure effectiveness relying mainly on a success crite-
rion which reflects the fact that stable exchange rates constitute the intervention
objective for these countries’ authorities. We rely on three success criteria in
our analysis to capture different intervention objectives: the ability of interven-
tion to change the direction of the exchange rate ("event" criterion), the ability
to smooth the path of the exchange rate ("smoothing" criterion), and the ability
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of intervention to stabilize the exchange rate to keep it in a narrow band ("sta-
bilization" criterion). While these criteria and the underlying objectives can be
mutually consistent, they capture different aspects of intervention effectiveness
and our results indicate that they are far from being perfectly correlated.
Based on these criteria, we find that an 80 percent success rate of FX interven-
tions is actually a fair description of past policy. The high effectiveness of inter-
ventions can most easily be recognized from the smoothing criterion, because
such a dampening of earlier exchange rate changes works in about 80 percent
of cases, basically independent of the exchange rate regime and the empirical
specification. Regarding the stabilization criterion, the success rate across all
countries and episodes would be misleading because often (obviously in float-
ing regimes) there is no ambition to strictly keep exchange rates within narrow
limits. However, when focusing on countries with narrow band regimes, the
success rate is at least 80 percent and can be further improved under certain
conditions.
Finally, regarding the conventional effectiveness criteria typically used for float-
ing exchange rate regimes, i.e. moving the exchange rate at the "event", the
baseline success rate is only about 60 percent. Thus paying attention to the con-
ditions of interventions is important. Interventions tend to be more effective (i)
if they are large in size, (ii) are executed in line with the prior exchange rate
trend, and (iii) towards longer run fundamental equilibrium. Moreover, we find
that appropriate communication of authorities can enhance effectiveness. Inter-
vention is more effective in terms of the event criterion if it is accompanied by
oral intervention and if oral intervention occurs during turbulent times.
We make some effort to deal with the endogeneity of interventions, regarding
their existence and the termination of intervention episodes. Still, we may
underestimate intervention success in periods where central banks intervene
against strong exchange rate trends, to provide an obvious example; this is par-
ticularly important because most interventions are “leaning against the wind”.
More generally, we are aware that our procedures are better understood as re-
duced form rather than structural estimations.
Overall, our main contribution to the literature is the systematic analysis of de-
terminants of effective intervention, which should be informative to policy mak-
ers and the public debate. We are the first to study such a broad cross-section
of countries with different exchange rate regimes and at different stages of de-
velopment, using data obtained on special request for this study from 33 central
banks. The results suggest that intervention in currency markets is more com-
mon practice and effective than we would have expected, and that intervention
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size and the communication strategy of central banks are important factors in
enhancing effectiveness.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the dataset. Section 2 pro-
vides stylized facts about FX intervention, and Section 3 shows our basic results
on the effectiveness of actual intervention. Results on the effectiveness of com-
munication (oral intervention) require data on press reports and are presented
in Section 4. Section 5 discusses issues related to the identification of actual
intervention, and Section 6 concludes.
1 Data
Actual intervention data are provided by 33 central banks issuing their own
currencies in advanced, emerging and developing economies. This section pro-
vides details on data sources, sample countries, classification of exchange rate
regimes, and representativeness of data.
Data sources. The dataset on actual, sterilized interventions comprises informa-
tion from public sources and information received from bilateral data requests.
To start with, we used all relevant data which have been previously published or
used in other publications, such as Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) or
central bank websites (see reference to sources in Table 1). We complemented
the public data with data which we received from bilateral data requests. The
countries which we approached were mainly from the members of the BIS Com-
mittee on the Global Financial System (CGFS). Further, we contacted those cen-
tral banks which, according to the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Restrictions published by the IMF (2010), collect daily intervention data.
Overall, we approached 27 countries bilaterally of which 23 granted us access
to their data. We obtained data on sterilized FX interventions by the respec-
tive institution at daily frequency with break-down by size and currency, for the
period from 1995 to 2011.
[Table 1 about here.]
Sterilized interventions. Our analysis of FX interventions focuses only on
sterilized interventions and our data request to central banks was specifically de-
signed to get data about sterilized interventions. These are interventions which
do not impact on the net foreign asset position of the public sector, which is
mostly proxied by the position of the central bank. Basically, this means that
the monetary base is not affected by these interventions. However, different
central banks may have different notions of sterilized intervention or different
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methods to sterilize, an issue to which we return later in the paper. Also, there
may be other reasons for central banks to buy or sell foreign currency that are
unrelated to their intentions to impact on FX rates, such as their foreign reserve
management, in some cases their function as agent for central governments, and
of course monetary policy operations. Therefore, we check later in the paper
that our main results hold for the subsample of countries that publish their inter-
vention data and that they hold when controlling for changes in monetary policy
variables.
Interventions are almost exclusively conducted against a reference currency.
This is usually the US dollar (USD) and, for European countries (and for the
U.S.), the Euro (see Table 1). In a few cases we have recalculated interventions
against another currency into the reference currency. Eliminating these cases
from the sample does not change any result qualitatively.
Sample countries. The dataset includes Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bo-
livia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
the European Monetary Union (EMU), Georgia, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel,
Japan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Moldova, New Zealand, Norway, Peru,
Poland, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United King-
dom, United States and Venezuela. No single one of these countries or partic-
ular periods is driving our results (see Internet Appendix I.1 and I.2). For nine
countries the data cover the full period of 17 years from January 1995 to De-
cember 2011. For another nine countries we have at least 15 years, and for the
remaining 15 countries data was supplied for at least ten years, with the excep-
tion of Switzerland with seven years (see details in Table 1). The sample covers
advanced, emerging and developing countries. Specifically, following the IMF
World Economic Outlook definitions (IMF 2014), the sample covers 83 per-
cent of advanced countries (30/36 countries, i.e. 13 currencies plus the Euro,
which represents 17 countries during our sample) and 40 percent of emerging
economies (10/25, plus nine poorer developing countries such as Bolivia). The
trading days covered by intervention data are split roughly in half among these
groups (46.2 percent to 53.8 percent, respectively).
Exchange rate regimes. In order to classify countries into exchange rate regimes
we use data on de facto (and not de jure) exchange rate arrangements by Rein-
hart and Rogoff (2004). Fortunately, most of our countries fall into just three
(out of six) coarse categories, which makes it straightforward to explicitly con-
sider these three exchange rate regimes in the main analyses. However, there
are not enough observations to analyze these regimes in separate sub-samples.
In most countries, i.e. 22 countries in our sample, the currency regime did not
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change over the observed period. The 11 exceptions are Argentina, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Georgia, Iceland, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Switzer-
land, Turkey and Venezuela, which reported interventions under more than one
regime type.
The most populated regime in our sample is group "2" of Reinhart-Rogoff’s
"coarse" currency regime classification, which includes pre-announced crawl-
ing peg, pre-announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/−2
percent, de facto crawling peg, and de facto crawling band that is narrower than
or equal to +/−2 percent: we name this regime "narrow band". Group "4"
covers countries with "freely floating" exchange rates and group "3" comprises
countries whose exchange rate regimes are in between the other two; we call this
group "broad band"2. Whereas group "4" is dominated by advanced economies,
group "2" is dominated by emerging and developing economies; group "3" is
mixed in this respect. Beyond these three groups of regimes there are three oth-
ers, coded "1", "5" and "6" in the Reinhart-Rogoff classification which we do
not analyze separately because they are rather special cases (definitions in Table
1), and because we only have few observations so that we cannot analyze these
groups while ensuring anonymity of countries.
Representativeness. The sample of countries cannot be perfectly representa-
tive, because it is based on the willingness of central banks to provide data. In
this respect, one could imagine that central banks conducting many secret inter-
ventions may not want to contribute to our study. However, we include a large
number of interventions not being noticed in the press, many of which may be
intentionally secret. Thus we can analyze the effects of many secret interven-
tions in our study. Considering also the realized high response rate among cen-
tral banks, our data are unlikely to be distorted by some form of self-selection
bias of the respondent central banks.
Minimum intervention size. Some of the interventions in our data are very
small, too small to be meaningful, even though they belong to those operations
that central banks themselves classify as interventions (which is the criterion
in our data collection exercise). In fact, most of these tiny transactions may be
motivated by market making activity. This leads to a trade-off between relevance
(of considering larger interventions) vs. completeness (considering all cases). In
order to mitigate this issue, we recode the intervention volumes for a total of 469
intervention days with intervention volumes smaller than 0.00001 percent of a
country’s GDP as zero, which corresponds to less than 0.001 percent of daily
2These regimes include de facto crawling bands narrower than or equal to ±5 percent, noncrawling band that
is narrower of up to ±2 percent and managed floating (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).
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traded volumes even for little traded currencies (see Table 1). For a country
of median size the chosen cutoff amounts to about 16,000 USD and average
recoded interventions are well below 5,000 USD. The largest single value of a
neglected intervention is 350,000 USD per day. These intervention days will
henceforth be treated as days without intervention.3
2 Stylized facts about interventions
The broad coverage of countries in our sample allows us to identify some basic
facts about FX interventions. These stylized facts refer to five dimensions, i.e.
the incidence of interventions, their direction (purchase or sale), their size, their
sequence, and characteristics of intervention days. We are also able to com-
pare intervention behavior across three major exchange rate regimes, i.e. free
floaters, broad bands and narrow bands.
Incidence. FX interventions are remarkably common. All of the central banks
we received data from intervened at some point between the beginning of 1995
and mid-2011, and a total of 113,844 trading days are covered in this period by
these central banks. On average, actual activity was reported by central banks
on 19.1 percent of trading days (see Table 2). Activity within floating and broad
band regimes is observed on about 8.7 percent of days, whereas within narrow
band regimes central banks are active on about 34 percent of trading days. Fig-
ure 1 plots the share of central banks purchasing or selling FX on a given day
during the sample period.
[Table 2 about here.]
Direction. On 76.1 percent of the intervention days we observe net purchases of
foreign currency and on the remaining days foreign currency is sold on balance.
While the share of purchases is expected to exceed 50 percent in a growing
world, 76 percent seems to be beyond this expectation. Moreover, this result is
surprising given the experiences from the Bretton Woods system and the many
FX crises thereafter, where typically the exchange rate was defended by selling
foreign currency (e.g. Eichengreen, 2008). By contrast, we find in our recent
sample that the large majority of interventions are purchases of foreign curren-
cies (see also Levy-Yeyati et al., 2013). This indicates a potential asymmetry in
the objectives of the central bank, consistent presumably with a desire to sup-
port exports. Interestingly, there is not much of a difference across exchange
rate regimes in this respect.
3The decrease in intervention days implied by this choice is driven by three countries which cover about three
quarters of these interventions. However, we show in Internet Appendix I.3 that the reduced sample does not lead
to qualitatively different results.
7
These aggregate statistics hide the fact that not all countries both buy and sell
foreign currency. Among the 33 countries covered, eight countries never pur-
chased foreign currency in the sample period, and eight others never sold foreign
currency. This indicates substantial heterogeneity across countries and their pol-
icy objectives.
Size. The size of FX interventions, i.e. the daily net transaction volume, is on
average 44.3 million USD, with higher volumes in free floating regimes. This
pattern is related to the size of the respective economies as the share of advanced
economies is highest in free floating regimes. For example, on average during
the sample, the larger advanced economies’ central banks purchase (sell) an
equivalent of USD 122.1 million (102.9) compared to USD 30.1 million (31.5)
in emerging and developing countries.4
Thus it is advisable to also use relative intervention volumes. Table 2 shows that
in GDP terms the average size of interventions in broad bands (0.03 percent) is
between those in floating regimes (0.02 percent) and narrow bands (0.05 per-
cent). However, floating regimes – mainly related to advanced economies – are
not only characterized by larger economies but also by much larger financial
markets. Thus, if we relate intervention size to the respective daily FX trading
volume, relative intervention size in floating regimes is even smaller compared
to the other regimes.5
Sequence. Typically, FX interventions take place in a repeated fashion. In the
case of FX buying, 68.6 percent of intervention days are preceded by an in-
tervention in the same direction from the same central bank on the day before
(86.9 percent during the three days before). In the case of foreign currency
sales, these shares are somewhat lower but still substantial (47.2 percent and
72.8 percent). Intervention days are thus typically part of a longer intervention
period, which complicates the analysis of their effects. In line with other papers
(e.g. Fratzscher, 2008), we apply a ten day gap between days with interventions
to define a new episode (see also Internet Appendix I.4 and I.5). This reason-
ably long gap between episodes makes it more plausible that episodes constitute
separate events.
Table 2 reports the total number of episodes and their average length. According
to our definition, the average length of an episode is 6.1 and 2.8 days for buying
4We use the exchange rate of the local currency with the USD or Euro to calculate the volume of the respective
intervention in the foreign currency the country intervenes against. For countries targeting the Euro we then use
the daily Euro-USD exchange rate to calculate the equivalent USD volume.
5Trading volume data are taken from the BIS triennial survey and interpolated linearly to yield values for the
time between the survey years. Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Georgia, Iceland, Kenya, Moldova, and
Venezuela are not included in BIS survey data and thus missing from statistics that feature traded FX volumes.
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and selling FX, respectively. The longest spell is, on average across countries,
55.7 trading days for FX purchases and 14.5 for FX sales. However, these av-
erages mask that the longest period of activity recorded in the sample was 345
trading days, i.e. almost 1.5 calendar years.
Further intervention characteristics. We find that central banks are typically
leaning against the wind, i.e. against the trend of the ten trading days before
the start of the intervention, in 66.5 percent of cases. Interventions go towards
the fundamental exchange rate in 48.0 percent of cases, where we simply use a
three-year moving average to approximate the fundamental value of a currency.6
Alternatively we also use the IMF’s Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange
rates as proxy for the fundamental value, leading to a share of interventions to-
wards the fundamental of 51.4 percent. Finally, we observe interventions during
periods of turbulence, defined as episodes when the VIX is more than two stan-
dard deviations above its median.7 In turbulent times, central banks are active
on 22.5 percent of days, slightly more than in tranquil times. This difference
is mostly driven by narrow band regimes and translates into longer intervention
episodes rather than frequently changing intervention directions, which would
constitute new episodes. In the regressions below, we will also approximate the
effect of volatility by including each country’s exchange rate volatility on the
first day of the intervention episode relative to the country’s maximum during
the sample. This variable is thus scaled between 0 and 1.
Summary. Considering all countries: FX interventions occur often (19.1 per-
cent of trading days); they are mainly purchases of the foreign currency (in 76.1
percent of cases); the average transaction is about 44 million USD per day; in-
terventions do not occur as single events but in sequences, and they occur most
often in countries following a narrow band regime, which is mainly chosen by
emerging and developing economies.
6Admittedly, this is a rudimentary measure of fundamental value and it is well documented that measuring a
currency’s fair value is a very complex task (e.g. Menkhoff et al., 2017, and the references therein). However, our
simple measure has the advantage to capture mean reversion in a simple way that does not require macroeconomic
data nor any econometric model while being easy to replicate. Results are not affected by using five-year or
eight-year moving averages, as we show later.
7The VIX is a widely used measure of expected short-term volatility of the S&P500 and it is based on the
implied stock market volatility embedded in S&P500 stock options. It is often used by academics and practitioners
to capture global risk aversion in financial markets.
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3 Effectiveness of actual interventions
3.A Effectiveness of intervention operations
The effectiveness of FX intervention policy is highly controversial and debated
(see, e.g., BIS, 2013a). There are three main lines of arguments that are put for-
ward by skeptics: the difficulty of changing the market outcome of the exchange
rate; the small size of central banks in increasingly large currency markets; and
the limited information in interventions as a policy signal.
Influencing market outcomes. FX interventions often run counter to prevailing
market forces. Thus, interventions should bring new information to the markets,
i.e. changing the market’s information set, in order to be effective. This is
no easy task because interventions take place when markets deliver outcomes
which policy makers do not like. In this sense interventions have to overcome
high hurdles, at least in market environments such as floating exchange rate
regimes.
Huge FX markets. A second source of skepticism is rooted in the limited size
of interventions in today’s very large and liquid FX markets. FX transactions
have substantially increased over the past decades, thus reducing the relative
importance of central bank actions over the same time period. Taking, for ex-
ample, FX reserves of all countries together the resulting amount of more than
4 trillion US dollars is in the same order of magnitude as daily transactions in
FX markets (see BIS, 2013b). Moreover, the distribution of reserves is concen-
trated in a few countries. For example, China alone holds almost half of them
and Japan contributes another 15 percent.8
Limited policy signals. The third line of argument against intervention is re-
lated to the ability of a central bank to signal its policy stance and provide new
information to financial markets (Mussa, 1981; Vitale, 2003). The skeptical
view here argues that it is in the interest of policy makers to signal intentions
such as the likely course of future monetary policy to the markets anyway, and
it is not clear what the additional contribution of FX intervention could be.
3.B Measures of effectiveness
The effectiveness of any FX intervention should be assessed with respect to
the intervention objectives. These objectives vary according to preferences and
circumstances, and true objectives will be in many cases impossible to find out.
8On a more optimistic note, however, Fatum (2015) argues that, for the Japanese foreign currency interventions
at the zero lower bound, intervention was effective. However, these interventions were evidently not fully sterilized
as bank deposits at the Bank of Japan increased at the same time.
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In line with the literature, we proceed more modestly and aim to approximate
intervention objectives. Regardless of the effectiveness measure, we analyze
intervention episodes in order to account for the fact that interventions tend to
last longer than one day. The last day of an intervention event is defined as a
day which is either followed by no similar intervention in the next 10 trading
days or by an intervention in the opposite direction.
The aim of affecting the exchange rate through intervention is often defined by
various empirical measures of effectiveness which we apply below (see Humpage,
1999; Fatum and Hutchison, 2003; Fratzscher, 2008, 2009). In the following we
present the three criteria that are meant to capture the heterogeneity of the main
exchange rate regimes’ objectives.
First, using the event criterion, we test whether the exchange rate moves in the
intended direction during the intervention episode. If the central bank buys
(sells) foreign currency, we code the event criterion "1" if – defining the ex-
change rate as the foreign currency price per one unit of domestic currency – the
exchange rate decreases (increases) during that episode. This criterion clearly
captures the intervention objective of affecting the level of the exchange rate
and thus fits well central banks’ behavior in free floating regimes. Of course,
moving the exchange rate in the intended direction is also desirable for central
banks that implement band regimes but for them other objectives are typically
more important. Second, an intervention objective followed by central banks re-
gardless of their exchange rate regime is to limit exchange rate volatility (Adler
and Tovar, 2011; Menkhoff, 2013; Daude et al., 2014; Cavallino, 2017).9 This
objective can be captured using the smoothing criterion, which is coded "1" if
the exchange rate change during and for five trading days after the intervention
is smaller than during the five trading days leading up to the intervention; de-
creasing the five days period makes this criterion less demanding. In line with
other studies, we choose a post-intervention window of five days (see Fatum and
Hutchison, 2003; Fratzscher, 2008). In order to make the criterion meaningful
we define it only for interventions against the trend of the previous five trading
days. Third, we complement the above standard criteria by also considering
what we call the stabilization criterion. This states that the exchange rate is kept
9This has been a major objective for many central banks (BIS, 2005), with about two thirds of polled central
banks calling "limiting exchange rate volatility" an immediate objective of intervention between 2005 and 2012
(Mohanty and Berger, 2013). An example is Mexico where the central bank posts on its website about the IMF’s
Staff Report for the 2017 Article IV Consultation: "There was agreement that exchange rate flexibility should
remain the key shock absorber. A flexible adjustment of the exchange rate is indispensable to restore equilibrium
in response to shocks. FX interventions in the spot market or through non-deliverable forwards (NDFs) settled
in local currency are better suited to respond to disorderly market conditions associated with excessive volatility.
Staff and the authorities agreed that a mix of exchange rate adjustment and intervention [. . . ] could be used to
address the materialization of risks" (IMF, 2017).
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within a narrow band of two percentage points during the whole intervention
event and the two weeks after its end. The definition of a two percentage point
range fits the definition of narrow band regimes by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
Central banks follow a set of potential objectives; in their survey of central banks
Mohanty and Berger (2013) aggregate these objectives into five groups, for ex-
ample.10 We use the above success criteria to capture these different objectives,
although this does not mean that these objectives are unrelated to each other. In
fact, they may well be mutually consistent in certain circumstances. For exam-
ple, if a central bank is leaning against the wind to reverse an appreciation trend
in the exchange rate, effective intervention will imply success both under the
event criterion (as the exchange rate changes direction) and the smoothing crite-
rion (as the trend in the exchange rate is reversed, thereby reducing its volatility).
However, if the intervention operation does not change the direction of the ex-
change rate but simply reduces the appreciation trend, this would imply lack of
success under the event criterion (direction does not change) but success under
the smoothing criterion (as the exchange rate trend becomes less strong). More
generally, the three different criteria capture different aspects of intervention ef-
fectiveness, and ex ante they are not perfectly correlated. In fact, the empirical
relationships between the three success criteria in terms of pairwise correlations,
reported in Table 3, suggest that the correlations across success criteria are far
from perfect, indicating that these criteria capture different objectives and that
success under one criterion does not necessarily require or imply success under
the others.
[Table 3 about here.]
3.C Unconditional outcomes of actual interventions
Having defined effectiveness criteria we first look at unconditional outcomes
of interventions for each of the three exchange rate regimes considered, i.e.
distinguishing freely floating exchange rates, broad bands and narrow bands.
For each of these regimes we report results for the two most relevant criteria.11
10Cavallino (2017) also shows that, in the context of a general New Keynesian equilibrium model with incom-
plete markets, under free float and some degree of nominal rigidities optimal exchange rate intervention implies
that the central bank wishes both to smooth exchange rates to reduce volatility and to affect the exchange rate level,
as distinct objectives. This would imply that both the event criterion and the smoothing criterion are meaningful
when evaluating effectiveness of a central bank operating under free float.
11However, we also report averages in the pooled sample across all regimes in Table A1 in the Internet Ap-
pendix. This table also includes “placebo” success rates for the counterfactual, i.e. the percentage of cases in
the pooled sample of non-intervention periods where exchange rates behave in line with the effectiveness mea-
sures. Furthermore, average success rates when weighting each country equally as well as average success rates
in turbulent times are reported.
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Free floaters (columns 1 and 2 in Table 4) have some success in influencing the
direction of exchange rates. In the short term more than 60 percent of FX inter-
ventions are successful at moving the exchange rate in the intended direction;
this is significantly better than random as the placebo rates show that success is
around 48 percent in our data.12 Smoothing is successful in 88 percent of cases.
[Table 4 about here.]
Countries pursuing narrow band regimes (columns 5 and 6) on the other hand
are mainly interested in the stabilization criterion. They are highly effective at
pursuing it, managing to keep the exchange rate within the narrow band in about
84 percent of intervention episodes. Of course, the benchmark of success – i.e.
exchange rates within the narrow band – is higher than 50 percent for narrow
band regimes; it is in fact 77 percent. These countries also succeed regarding the
smoothing criterion, as do the broad band regimes (columns 3 and 4) many of
which do not aim to stabilize the exchange rate within a narrow band and often
target broader bands between 2 percent and 5 percent (Reinhart and Rogoff,
2004). It is thus not surprising that many of the latter do succeed in stabilizing
their exchange rate according to our 2 percent criterion.13
3.D Determinants of effectiveness in actual interventions
Next, we analyze which intervention characteristics are associated with higher
probability of success. To account for heterogeneity between regimes, we al-
ways include currency regime-specific intercepts (which are easier to interpret
than classical fixed effects). However, due to the small number of countries (ob-
servations) in the floating regime, we cannot usefully run regressions for each
regime separately without undermining the confidential nature of our data. In
the baseline regression we allow for other variables to capture four further con-
siderations.
The first consideration is that "larger" interventions should improve the prob-
ability of success independent of success criterion and exchange rate regimes
12Placebo rates are calculated by creating intervention days in random directions on non-intervention days
and calculating the success criteria for placebo intervention episodes with median country-specific intervention
lengths. The simple averages above therefore do not assume any selection mechanism for intervention along the
lines of a reaction function that takes into account market circumstances. Such extended analyses are presented
later in the paper. Finally, note that we report p-values in Table 4 to formally document that the success rate in
each column is statistically significantly different from placebo rates; this is always the case except for column 4,
corroborating the interpretation that follows.
13In Table A2 we show that stylized results shown in the next section remain similar when using alternative
bandwidth ranging from 2 percent to 5 percent and are robust to restricting the subsample to narrow and broad
band regimes, only.
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(Fatum and Yamamoto, 2014; indirectly in Dominguez et al., 2013). To cap-
ture this we control for the average intervention size during an event as a share
of the GDP of the intervening country. Second, we test whether interventions
occurring in line with a prior trend are more likely to succeed in moving the ex-
change rate. This could be expected because intervention does not "lean against
the wind" of market forces. Third, we expect that intervention is more effec-
tive if it occurs in line with fundamentals. Such an intervention motivation is
often relevant in free floating regimes, so that it should align with the event cri-
terion. However, band regimes aim more at keeping the exchange rate stable
than keeping it closely in line with a fundamental rate so that we do not expect
this intervention characteristic to strongly support the smoothing or even less the
stabilization criterion.14 Fourth, we analyze whether volatility has any influence
on intervention effectiveness. Higher volatility is expected to be unrelated to the
event criterion but a clear characteristic to stimulate smoothing interventions; if
these succeed (as the unconditional results indicate) the expected coefficient
sign is positive. By contrast, volatility makes stabilization efforts clearly diffi-
cult so that it is unclear whether the relation between volatility and stabilization
success is indeed positive. As the volatility over a period is not easily compara-
ble across countries, for example because of regime differences and market size,
we consider the degree of local volatility relative to the country’s maximum.15
The role of other covariates, such as the length of an intervention episode or the
global market environment, is tested in the Appendix (see Table A3).
Results using OLS regressions are shown in Table 5. Logistic regressions yield
qualitatively identical results, as we show in the Internet Appendix I.10. How-
ever, OLS regressions allow adding up of the coefficients of the various inter-
vention conditions. The left-hand-side variable is the respective effectiveness
measure which is coded as a binary variable indicating success. The character-
istics of intervention episodes are included in the vector Xi. We then estimate
the success criterion cir in intervention episode i in regime r as
cir = θr + γXi + ir,
where θr denotes currency regime fixed effects that are introduced as regime-
specific intercepts and ir is the error term.
14The fundamental exchange rate is defined as the three-year moving average of the exchange rate. Results are
qualitatively robust to various modifications, including those relying on PPP exchange rates, as shown in Internet
Appendix robustness points I.6, I.7 and I.8.
15This is measured as the quarterly exchange rate volatility on the first day of the intervention episode as a
share of the country’s maximum during the sample period. Using alternative measures of volatility does not
change results qualitatively, see Internet Appendix I.9.
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[Table 5 about here.]
Event criterion. We provide evidence on the effectiveness of intervention in
Table 5. Looking at the event criterion, which is key for free floating regimes,
we see that the pure purchase or sale of FX has a probability of success of 0.53 in
free floating regimes. This baseline success rate is well above the placebo suc-
cess rate in Table 4 for free floaters but not for other regimes, which is expected
given that this criterion is mainly relevant for intervention of free floaters.16
In fact, the likelihood of intervention success can increase further depending
on the characteristics of an intervention. Larger interventions are significantly
more likely to move the exchange rate in the intended direction; large inter-
vention sizes of, for example, 0.4 percent of a country’s GDP increase success
probability by about 13.2 percentage points. Also, interventions that are in line
with markets, i.e. with the trend in the two weeks before the intervention, are
significantly more successful. Intervening with a trend is associated with a 9.9
percentage point increase in the success rate. The probability that interventions
towards the fundamental value succeed increases with the distance between the
exchange rate and its fundamental value. For the median misalignment of the
exchange rate from its fundamental value, the increase in the success rate is
3.5 percentage points. Accordingly, the increase is much higher for severely
misaligned currencies. We conclude that under the event criterion interventions
in free floating regimes are mostly effective, and effectiveness increases under
specific circumstances. For example, adding up coefficients as discussed above,
the success rate as measured by the event criterion increases to about 80 percent
(53.2+ 13.2 + 9.9 + 3.5 = 80.0). However, under the event criterion effectiveness
is weaker for other exchange rate regimes, as expected.17
Smoothing criterion. Interventions are quite effective at smoothing exchange
rates. This holds for all exchange rate regimes. In essence, under any regime the
central bank is successful in decreasing the pace of an appreciation or deprecia-
tion. Due to success rates of more than 70 percent there is not much scope for
further improving performance. However, we find that smoothing is more likely
to be successful in highly volatile phases.
16Specifically, compared to the freely floating currency regime, the regime-specific intercepts show that narrow
and also broad band regimes are much less successful according to the event criterion which makes sense given
their targets. For an overview across all success criteria and regime types, see Table A4 in the Internet Appendix.
17In an additional analysis we look at the effect of size on intervention success by calculating elasticities. The
sample is confined to free floating regimes and days without an intervention on the previous day, in order to focus
on the more relevant cases. The relation between intervention volume (as percent of GDP) and the percentage
change of the exchange rate needs to be estimated separately for purchases and sales of foreign currency because
these will move the exchange rate in opposite directions if effective. We find that the coefficient for sales is much
larger than for purchases, and that they are both strongly statistically significant (see Table A5 in the Internet
Appendix and further discussion in Internet Appendix I.11).
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Stabilization criterion. The stabilization criterion is of particular relevance for
narrow band regimes and this is confirmed by the results in Table 5. Interven-
tions in volatile times (according to the local volatility measure) are less likely
to restrict the exchange rate to the narrow two percent band which is specified
as a success. As interventions towards the fundamental are more likely to move
the exchange rate, interventions occurring when exchange rates are further away
from fundamental value are associated with a decrease of the likelihood of a sta-
ble exchange rate in the subsequent days. Most remarkable seems to be the very
high regime-specific intercept for the narrow band regime (0.949), indicating
that intervention works very well, while high local volatility is the major ham-
pering factor. For broad band regimes, the intercept is only one third smaller
than for narrow band regimes, and for free floaters the estimate is less than half.
In short, the pecking order for success under the stabilization criterion confirms
the prior that this criterion is primarily relevant for exchange rate regimes with
little flexibility of the currency, and increasingly less relevant as one moves to-
wards more flexible exchange rate regimes.
Discussion. Overall, we see that intervention effectiveness is systematically de-
termined by several plausible characteristics: If in floating regimes the main
intervention objective is moving exchange rates, it is important to consider sev-
eral determinants of success, such as intervening with large volumes. According
to our evidence, then success can occur in 80 percent of cases (the interpreta-
tion is explained in detail in Internet Appendix I.12). This success is somewhat
lower at 70 percent in broad band regimes while it is not there for narrow bands.
Interestingly, smoothing due to interventions seems to work quite well, espe-
cially in more volatile periods and regardless of the FX regime. Finally, tight
exchange rate stabilization works best in narrow band regimes but much less in
the other regimes and is only endangered by very high exchange rate volatility.
4 Effectiveness of central bank communication to
intervention success
In this section we consider the effect of authorities’ communication on exchange
rates. It is well known that communication can support monetary policy (Blin-
der et al., 2008) or non-sterilized FX intervention (Burkhard and Fischer, 2009).
Fratzscher (2008) also provides evidence on effectiveness of oral intervention,
which we extend here. Thus, in the next section we introduce the underlying
press report data for analyzing the role of authorities’ communication. Then,
we provide our baseline results on oral intervention as well as further exten-
sions.
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Data about authorities’ communication. In order to test the effect of com-
munication we analyze press reports covered by the database Factiva. We use
a standardized working procedure where news reports for each currency are
searched including keywords such as "FX" and "intervention"; we also allow for
different spelling and abbreviations. Before coding the resulting news reports
we defined the criteria for events of interest. All news reports were then coded
using double entry. In doing so, we check whether officials (mainly from the
central bank) have talked about intervention, i.e. whether an oral intervention
in addition to an actual intervention takes place. We define oral interventions
as statements by the central bank or minister of finance in favor or against a
currency. This can mean comments about the future likelihood of intervention
or the currency is talked into a particular direction. The announcement is tied to
the specific day it occurred but the intention can be general and forward looking.
In principle, an oral intervention could take place without an actual intervention,
providing the interesting case of "isolated" oral intervention. However, there are
just about 20 such cases in our sample. Thus, we cannot reliably work with this
extremely small sample.
Authorities very often talk to the market about interventions or currencies more
generally, and thus oral interventions are frequent and occur in 51.9 percent of
all intervention episodes. As expected, this share is much higher in free floating
regimes (with 96.8 percent) and broad band regimes (99.6 percent) than in nar-
row band regimes (30.9 percent). As we are only using actual interventions in
these estimations, the oral interventions we analyze here always go hand in hand
with actual activity. In this sense oral intervention is intended to reinforce ac-
tual intervention. The multivariate regression controls for some circumstances
of intervention such as previous exchange rate volatility. Still, it cannot be ruled
out that central banks decide to intervene orally when they consider the mar-
ket environment to require extra guidance. This applies especially to the event
criterion which is key for free floaters who need to explain to financial markets
why they intervene.
Oral intervention could furthermore have greater potential according to the smooth-
ing and stabilization criterion in turbulent times, when authorities may provide
useful guidance to markets. Evidence for this case is provided, for example, by
Égert and Kocˇenda (2014) for three Eastern European exchange rates and by
Born et al. (2014) for the effect of central bankers’ speeches. The theoretical
case for intervention at times of higher risk aversion is also made in the model
of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015). Therefore, in addition to a dummy variable
for oral interventions we consider the potential importance of communication
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in turbulent times by introducing an interaction term between turbulent times
and oral intervention.
Empirical results. Turning to empirical results, we find that oral interventions
not only increase the odds of moving the exchange rate when only including
a dummy for oral interventions (Table A6); they also substantially increase
the success rate of interventions in turbulent times, according to the event and
smoothing criterion (Table 6).18 This seems to suggest that central bankers’
communication is taken particularly seriously by markets in volatile phases.
However, regarding the stabilization criterion there is no effect of oral inter-
ventions. Additional analyses for narrow bands indicate that the positive effect
of oral intervention comes from more flexible regimes.
[Table 6 about here.]
Pre-announcement of regime. As we have seen that oral intervention can be
a way to inform markets and thus to increase effectiveness of actual interven-
tions, we study differences between cases where authorities do and do not make
an announcement regarding their strategy. While typically using the coarse grid
classification, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) also offer a finer grid, which distin-
guishes between regimes that are pre-announced and not-pre-announced within
the coarse categories. We construct a dummy variable which takes the value
1 if authorities have pre-announced their regime. This is then interacted with
oral interventions in the specification known from Table 6.19 The estimates are
reported in Table A7 and show that central banks that do not pre-announce their
regime can use oral interventions to significantly increase their likelihood of
successfully moving the exchange rate. In this case, a small and statistically
significant effect is also found for the stabilization criterion. Hence, oral inter-
ventions seem to be particularly effective if the market is unsure about the exact
policy of the central bank.
On channels of intervention. Overall, if there are benefits of explicit oral in-
terventions, in particular during turbulent times, this has implications for the
potential channels by which interventions may impact on exchange rates. The
link to the signaling channel, the main channel by which oral communication
can have any effect, is obvious. The portfolio balance effect may also be at work
as larger intervention sizes have stronger impact in our data, which is consistent
18Adding interaction terms of oral intervention with other intervention characteristics such as size, leaning with
the wind or intervention towards the fundamental (results available on request) does not affect the above mentioned
positive significant interaction of oral intervention and intervention in turbulent times.
19To take account of the use of the finer grid, we use finer grid currency-regime fixed effects instead of the
coarse grid effects that are generally used in this paper.
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with the standard mechanism of portfolio balance models, whereby larger in-
terventions induce larger changes in private sector portfolios and thereby larger
changes in exchange rates and risk premia. However, as a note of caution, we
are mindful that our reduced-form regressions do not allow us to precisely dis-
entangle the different channels of FX intervention, which in our view requires a
more structural estimation approach than our event study methodology allows.
5 On identification of FX interventions
The empirical analysis of FX intervention is often plagued by the problem of
clearly isolating the causal effect of this policy instrument. We address two con-
cerns that arise in this context. First, the use of FX interventions is often the
result of specific circumstances in FX markets, potentially resulting in endo-
geneity (Section 5.A). Second, FX intervention is a policy measure which may
be used in combination with monetary policy instruments (Section 5.B).
5.A On the endogeneity of FX interventions
The issue of isolating a causal effect of FX interventions against the potential
influence from specific circumstances in the markets has been addressed in the
literature using a variety of methods, which we fully discuss in the Internet
Appendix II. Here we simply present a qualitative discussion on the role of
endogeneity in empirical work and apply a matching approach.
Qualitative reasoning. Let us start from noting the general point that FX in-
terventions do not occur randomly. Rather, intervention decisions are typically
motivated by unwanted market developments, implying that the circumstances
for interventions are disadvantageous; this generates bias against intervention
success. This effect may be reduced, however, by the experience of the cen-
tral banks which select periods in which they see a good chance to realize their
ambitions. An example in this direction is knowledge about intra-daily market
circumstances which can increase intervention effectiveness (see Dominguez,
2003). This kind of endogeneity in favor of success, however, is rooted in the au-
thorities’ ability and thus represents a kind of missing determinant in our frame-
work. More generally, omitted variables related to other macro policy actions
that can impact on exchange rates, most obviously monetary policy actions, can
generate bias that over-estimates the impact of intervention. Furthermore, inde-
pendent of the timing, also the design of the intervention by the central bank may
be co-determined by market circumstances, requiring some caution in interpret-
ing the effects that are at the discretion of the central bank, namely intervention
size and whether actual intervention is paired with oral intervention. In short,
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there are various aspects making the estimation of the effectiveness of FX inter-
vention a difficult task, and various methods that can be used to investigate the
importance of this issue, to which we now turn.
A matching approach. This approach involves selecting suitable counterfac-
tuals by a matching mechanism to account for market circumstances (see Fa-
tum and Hutchison, 2010). We build on this idea to match actual intervention
events and placebo events, and yield a treatment and a control group. Actual
and placebo success criteria are then used to create a joint outcome variable,
taking the actual success rate for actual events and the placebo success rate for
placebo events. We then use a nearest neighbor matching algorithm to match
within country each actual episode with the most similar placebo episode using
the characteristics that were most important according to Table A8 (this table
reports results on a central bank reaction function approach which is described
in detail in the Internet Appendix II). These are the lagged absolute FX mis-
alignment and the lagged absolute change in the exchange rate leading up to the
day before the first (actual/placebo) intervention day. Furthermore we account
for intervention length.20 In Table 7 we report results for the treatment effect
when basically reproducing Table 4 above. The results are consistent with those
in Table 4, but the size of coefficients is larger, indicating that our earlier results
may underestimate the true intervention effectiveness.21
[Table 7 about here.]
5.B FX interventions and monetary policy
A natural concern about any analysis of FX interventions is whether interven-
tions are accompanied by further policy measures, in particular by monetary
policy, and thus the measured intervention effect may be illusive. A straightfor-
ward way to check this concern is by analyzing whether interest rates change at
times of intervention. It could occur that the sale of foreign currency, in order to
stabilize the domestic currency, is accompanied by an increase of the short-term
domestic interest rate. We calculate the day-on-day change in the domestic in-
terest rate (∆i) using money market rates for countries for which daily data are
available. The results do not indicate any systematic change in interest rates on
days with interventions (Table A10 in the Internet Appendix). Furthermore, we
test whether intervention effectiveness is systematically associated with those
unrelated changes in interest rates (Table A11). As these regressions use a
20Matching is possible for most episodes. In a few cases matching fails, typically because there is no close
enough equivalent placebo intervention regarding the FX misalignment. This requires some trimming of the data.
21Alternative matching estimates using different misalignment horizons are provided in Table A9.
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smaller sample than the one of our main regressions due to data availability,
we repeat the examinations underlying our main Table 5 for this subset in Table
A12, which yields no systematic differences relative to the main sample. Thus,
the results indicate that interventions and interest rate policy are rather indepen-
dent, which confirms that the central banks in our sample provided us with the
data on sterilized intervention as per our request.22
6 Conclusion
FX intervention is a controversial policy tool as much literature has not detected
systematic evidence that intervention moves exchange rates in the intended way.
This result is often supported by two lines of argument. First, the FX market is
the largest financial market in the world by volume (BIS, 2013b) and over time
central banks have become increasingly smaller players in terms of trading vol-
ume. Second, FX markets incorporate fundamental news quickly (Andersen et
al., 2003), and in the long-run they are anchored to fundamentals (Mark and Sul,
2001; Engel et al., 2008), which raises the question of what central banks can
convey beyond available knowledge. In contrast to this view, survey evidence
suggests that central bankers around the world believe in the usefulness of FX
intervention (e.g., Neely, 2008). Thus, is FX intervention effective?
Using confidential data on FX intervention, we make a general assessment of
intervention effectiveness for 33 central banks. First, this broad set of central
banks has intervened, on average across countries and time, 19 percent of our
daily observations, which suggests that this policy tool is widely and commonly
used. Indeed all central banks in the sample intervene over the period from
1995 to 2011, irrespective of their exchange rate regime. Second, we find clear
evidence that FX intervention is an effective policy tool. To give an order of
magnitude, interventions in our sample tend to be effective in about 80 percent
of cases under some criteria. Of course, intervention effectiveness depends on
circumstances. Considering the effectiveness in various exchange rate regimes,
intervention stabilizes exchange rates in more than 80 percent of cases if one
looks at narrow band regimes. Also, if the objective is to smooth exchange rates,
intervention works quite well in all major regimes, including broad bands. It is
when authorities intend to move the level of exchange rates by interventions in
floating regimes where conditions are most important: the baseline success rate
is around 60 percent but it can increase to 80 percent if the intervention size is
very large and if it follows the trend rather than leaning against it. Moreover, in-
22Intervention could also be associated with changes in the monetary base if not fully sterilized. Running
regressions at quarterly frequency we find that net intervention amounts are uncorrelated with changes in the
monetary base as Table A13 in the Internet Appendix shows.
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tervention is more effective if it is accompanied by oral intervention, especially
in turbulent times.
Overall, given the difficulty of influencing financial markets and that our data
are based on true intervention operations of central banks, the evidence reported
in this paper indicates that authorities around the world master the art of FX
intervention better than one might expect.
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Notes: The graph reports intervention activity smoothed using a rolling moving average including 20 lagged and
forward trading days each.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 1: Daily shares of foreign exchange purchasing and selling central banks in the sample
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Argentina Public USD 2003 2011 235 12761 964 2.6
Australia Not public USD 1998 2011 684 32910 45167 4
Azerbaijan Not public USD 2001 2011 24 6108 2
Bolivia Not public USD 2000 2011 12 3807 2
Canada Not public USD 1995 2011 952 32745 30636 2,3
Chile Public USD 2001 2011 129 13508 3416 3
Colombia Not public USD 1999 2011 158 7605 1385 3
Costa Rica Not public USD 1996 2011 21 9237 2
Croatia Not public EUR 1996 2011 38 14076 2
Czech Rep. Not public EUR 1995 2011 110 19322 949 2,3
Denmark Not public EUR 1995 2011 230 30819 3227 1,2
Georgia Public USD 2002 2009 6.9 3770 2,3
Hong Kong Not public USD 1998 2009 178 33966 34435 1
Iceland Not public USD 1995 2011 11 31177 2,3
Israel Not public USD 1995 2011 137 24257 2492 3
Japan Public USD 1995 2011 4534 28441 133987 4
Kenya Not public USD 1999 2011 20 1381 2
Kyrgyz Rep Public USD 1998 2011 2.8 1759 2,5
Mexico Public USD 1997 2011 769 12136 13303 3
Moldova Not public USD 1996 2011 2.9 2105 1,2,5
New Zealand Not public USD 1995 2010 86 22395 4186 3
Norway Not public EUR 1995 2011 253 43339 1504 3
Peru Not public USD 1995 2011 77 6230 461 2
Poland Not public EUR 1995 2010 267 12533 874 3
Slovakia Not public EUR 1999 2008 42 15164 166 2
South Africa Not public USD 1999 2010 169 7660 7536 4
Sweden Not public EUR 1995 2006 288 26782 2412 3
Switzerland Public USD 1995 2001 295 29516 17851 2,3
Turkey Public USD 2002 2011 510 11289 5268 4,5
UK Public EUR 1995 2011 1859 29020 36865 3
US Public EUR 1997 2011 11561 41377 170043 4
Venezuela Not public USD 1997 2011 161 10028 2,6
EMU Not public USD 1999 2011 9724 28813 47732 4
Notes: EUR indicates that reference currency was DEM before the introduction of the Euro.
a: Source: BIS survey. Not available for all countries. b: According to Reinhart’s and
Rogoff’s "coarse grid". The most rigid regimes are coded 1. Narrow bands (2) comprise
preannounced crawling pegs, prennounced crawling bands that are narrower than or equal to
±2 percent, de facto crawling pegs, de facto crawling bands that are narrower than or equal to
±2 percent, as well as preannounced crawling bands that are wider than ±2 percent. Broad
bands (3) comprise de facto crawling bands that are narrower than or equal to ±5 percent,
noncrawling bands that are narrower than or equal to ±2 percent and managed floats. Freely
floating is coded 4. Freely falling is coded 5 and dual markets in which parallel market data
is missing is coded 6.
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Number of country-regime observationsa 43 6 14 17 6
Trading days covered 113,842 19,330 41,604 42,961 9,947
Share of days with FX intervention 0.191 0.073 0.093 0.336 0.207
Share of these with FX purchase 0.761 0.948 0.735 0.732 0.636
Share of these with FX sale 0.239 0.052 0.265 0.268 0.364
Average daily volume on intervention day in million USD 44.3 59.2 42.7 27.1 157.7
Average daily volume of FX purchases in million USD 44.4 52.7 45.8 24.9 190.6
Average daily volume of FX sales in million USD 44.1 177.1 34.2 33.3 100.2
Average daily intervention size as share of GDP 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0010
Average daily intervention size as share of daily traded fx volumeb 0.046 0.010 0.052 0.051 0.065
FX purchasing episodesc 2,388 70 551 1,491 276
FX sale episodesc 2,161 25 511 1,402 223
Average length of episode in days 4.5 9.2 3.5 4.8 4.4
Share of intervention episodes leaning with the wind 0.355 0.253 0.471 0.333 0.256
Share of intervention episodes towards the fundamental 0.480 0.400 0.488 0.482 0.466
Trading days covered in turbulent times 5,638 949 1,975 2,178 536
Share of days with FX intervention in turbulent times 0.225 0.027 0.092 0.435 0.207
Notes: a: Countries changing their regimes are counted more than once. No country returned to a previous regime after
an interruption. Country-regime combinations are combined in "other", i.e. belong to other regime classifications such as
pegs. b: Not available for all emerging markets, cf. Table 1. c: According to 10 day definition. Interventions leaning with
the wind are defined as interventions that take the same direction as the previous two weeks’ trend. Interventions towards
the fundamental that aim into the direction of the three year moving average of the exchange rate. Turbulent times are
defined as times when the CBOE VIX is 2 standard deviations above its median during the covered period.
Table 3: Correlation between success criteria
Success criterion event smoothing stabilization
event 1.00
smoothing 0.31 1.00
stabilization -0.08 0.05 1.00
Notes: The event criterion defines success as movement of the exchange rate
during the intervention that is consistent with the intervention’s effect on the
exchange rate. The smoothing criterion counts a reduction in the absolute slope
during the event and for the next week compared to the week before the event
as success. The sample size for the smoothing criterion is lower because it is
only defined for interventions against the one week trend. The stabilization
criterion counts success as the exchange rate staying within a 2 percent band
during the event and during the next 2 weeks.
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Table 4: Unconditional success rates of intervention episodes by regime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regime Free Floater Broad Band Narrow Band
Criterion Event Smooth Smooth StabilizeSmooth Stabilize
Intervention episodes 0.611 0.883 0.791 0.348 0.781 0.840
Placebo rates 0.481 0.401 0.396 0.495 0.342 0.768
P-value (H0: equal effectiveness) 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P-value (H0: actual ≤ placebo) 0.006 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
Actual events 95 77 561 1,062 1,010 2,893
Notes: The (unmatched, cf. Table 7) placebo effectiveness is calculated based on all
days that do not belong to an intervention episode. The event criterion defines success
as movement of the exchange rate during the intervention that is consistent with the
intervention’s effect on the exchange rate. The smoothing criterion counts a reduction in
the absolute slope during the event and for the next week compared to the week before
the event as success. The stabilization criterion counts success as the exchange rate
staying within a 2 percent band during the event and during the next 2 weeks. The sample
size for the smoothing criterion is lower because it is only defined for interventions
against the one week trend. The panels are separated according to the "coarse grid" by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). Broad bands comprise pre announced crawling bands of at
least ±2 percent, de facto crawling bands of up to ±5 percent, moving bands of up to
±2 percent and managed floats. Narrow bands comprise more rigid arrangements. The
p-values indicate tests with the H0 that actual intervention is equally likely to affect the
success criteria as placebo intervention (top) and the one-sided hypothesis that actual
intervention is more effective than placebo interventions.
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Table 5: Determinants of effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention
(1) (2) (3)
Criterion Event Smoothing Stabilization
Regime-specific intercepts
Free Floater 0.532*** 0.798*** 0.435***
(0.053) (0.043) (0.044)
Broad Band 0.414*** 0.712*** 0.609***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.024)
Narrow Band 0.213*** 0.745*** 0.949***
(0.012) (0.018) (0.009)
Other Regime 0.133*** 0.835*** 1.004***
(0.021) (0.031) (0.013)
Intervention characteristics
Average daily intervention size in percent of GDP 0.330*** 0.115 0.104
(0.104) (0.077) (0.064)
Intervention with prior 2 weeks’ trend (0/1) 0.099*** -0.065** 0.011
(0.015) (0.028) (0.012)
Intervention towards fundamental 0.004*** 0.001 -0.004***
(based on distance to 3Y-MA) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of max. local volatility 0.004 0.215*** -0.597***
(0.041) (0.050) (0.039)
Observations 4,549 1,787 4,549
Adj. R-squared 0.373 0.800 0.810
Notes: The table reports estimates from our event study approach. The event crite-
rion defines success as movement of the exchange rate during the intervention that is
consistent with the intervention’s effect on the exchange rate. The smoothing crite-
rion counts a reduction in the absolute slope during the event and for the next week
compared to the week before the event as success. The sample size for the smooth-
ing criterion is lower because it is only defined for interventions against the one week
trend. The stabilization criterion counts success as the exchange rate staying within a
2 percent band during the event and during the next 2 weeks. Currency regime fixed
effects are dummy variables based on the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate sig-
nificance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 6: Effectiveness and oral intervention by central banks
(1) (2) (3)
Criterion Event Smoothing Stabilization
Regime-specific intercepts
Free Floater 0.462*** 0.873*** 0.477***
(0.056) (0.048) (0.046)
Broad Band 0.340*** 0.790*** 0.655***
(0.029) (0.036) (0.027)
Narrow Band 0.192*** 0.791*** 0.964***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.010)
Other Regime 0.081*** 0.886*** 1.038***
(0.025) (0.032) (0.016)
Intervention characteristics
Average daily intervention size in percent of GDP 0.274*** 0.153** 0.146**
(0.102) (0.077) (0.064)
Intervention with prior 2 weeks’ trend (0/1) 0.094*** -0.067** 0.014
(0.015) (0.028) (0.012)
Intervention towards fundamental 0.004*** 0.000 -0.005***
(based on distance to 3Y-MA) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of max. local volatility -0.038 0.214*** -0.548***
(0.042) (0.052) (0.042)
Communication
Any oral intervention (0/1) 0.087*** -0.079*** -0.059***
(0.018) (0.024) (0.013)
Turbulent time (0/1) -0.057 -0.128* -0.053
(0.041) (0.074) (0.044)
Oral intervention (0/1) x Turbulent time (0/1) 0.133** 0.170** -0.063
(0.060) (0.085) (0.055)
Adj. R2 0.377 0.802 0.811
Observations 4,549 1,787 4,549
Notes: The event criterion defines success as movement of the exchange rate during the inter-
vention that is consistent with the intervention’s effect on the exchange rate. The smoothing
criterion counts a reduction in the absolute slope during the event and for the next week com-
pared to the week before the event as success. The sample size for the smoothing criterion
is lower because it is only defined for interventions against the one week trend. The stabi-
lization criterion counts success as the exchange rate staying within a 2 percent band during
the event and during the next 2 weeks. Currency regime fixed effects are dummy variables
based on the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification. See Table A14 for a this setup esti-
mated by logit and Table A6 for specification without interaction terms for turbulent times.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 7: Matching events and placebo events by country on misalignment and previous FX change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Criterion Event Smoothing Smoothing Stabilize Smoothing Stabilize
Regime Free Floater Free Floater Broad Band Broad Band Narrow Band Narrow Band
Estimator nn-match nn-match nn-match nn-match nn-match nn-match
Average Treatment Effect 0.250*** 0.329*** 0.267*** -0.001 0.347*** 0.104***
on the Treated (0.067) (0.112) (0.094) (0.079) (0.060) (0.015)
Observations 18,533 9,556 25,940 28,376 17,671 25,556
Notes: Nearest neighbor matching with bias correction using, as suggested by Table A8, the lagged absolute misalignment
from the 5, 3 and 1 year moving average (uncentered, previous year) of the exchange rate and the absolute change in the
exchange rate leading to the previous day. Exact matching within country is used resulting in some observations that cannot
be matched and which are excluded. The placebo intervention episodes are designed to have the country-specific median
length of the intervention episodes and the length is accounted for in the matching procedure. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The number of observations indicates first days of intervention
episodes plus the number of days that are not part of an intervention episode and for which placebo events are calculated.
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